It is not at all strange that Collier remained so long in oblivion, nor is it really surprising that he has again relapsed into it, in spite of the efforts made about 75 years ago to rescue him. The work by which he chiefly claims recognition is Clavis universalis. But this book in itself is not more remarkable than many other English philosophical tracts published about the beginning of the 18th century, which attracted little attention when they were published, and are now ignored even by professed philosophers. Such rare treatises as Richard Burthogge's "Essay upon reason and the nature of spirits", and John Norris's "Essay towards the theory of the ideal or intelligible world, may be specially mentioned. In themselves these works are quite as important as Colliers book, but to the English student of philosophy they are unknown, and no attempt seems to have been made to reprint them. It is safe to say that Collier's book would have remained in as great obscurity as these and many others, had it not been for the odd fact that it contains a theory strangely similar to that of Berkeley, whose principles of human knowledge appeared three years before it. To this coincidence is due the modicum of attention that has been given to Collier.
For a hundred years after his death Collier remained, in Britain at feast, in almost complete oblivion magazine" and'"Notes and Queries" contain no reference to him. Then Reid chanced on a copy of "Clavis" iii the Glasgow University Library, and gave a brief account of it in his "Essays on the intellectual Powers of man" (Essay 2, chapter 10). But Reid cannot have read it very carefully, for he says that Collier's arguments are the same in essence as Berkeley's. This is far from being the case. Reid's notice brought "Clavis" to the attention of Dugald Stewart, who devoted a-note to Collier in his "Dissertation on the history of metaphysical science" (1, 349). Stewart had a high opinion of Collier's work, and writes: "When compared with the writings of Berkeley, it yields to them less in force of argument than in composition and variety of illustration". Stewart also refers to its "logical closeness and precision", qualities which in fact it eminently lacks. These references aroused the interest of Dr. Parr and of an Edinburgh society, and the result was the almost simultaneous publication of "Clavis", by the Edinburgh society in a handsome edition in 1836, and in "Metaphysical tracts by english philosophers of the eighteenth c6ntury", which Dr. Parr prejpared for the press before his death, in 1837. In 1837 a*so appeared "Memoirs ofthe rev". Arthur Collier, by Robert Benson. This Mr. Benson was a descendant of Collier's sister, and possessed a quantity of Collier's unpublished manuscripts. A notice of the last two books was written by Hamilton in the "Edinburgh Review" in 1839. But after this Collier again relapsed into obscurity, and apart from one or two references to him in Eraser's editions of Berkeley, he would seem to be entirely ignored 2 ).
But in Germany Collier's work attracted some attention. In 1717 a careful abstract of "Clavis" appeared in the "Acta eruditorum, (Supplementary volume VI, 244) . Though this resumo runs to only 5y 2 pages, it is so excellent and complete that German philosophers were probably content to take their knowledge of Collier's views entirely from it. Collier is twice referred to by Bilfinger in his "Dilucidatkmes Philosophicae". Bilfmger, suggests that C. Wolff refers to Collier. "Putο ilium (i.e. Wolff)intendere digitum adArthurum Collierium, de quo ex Actis Lips, notum est, ilium vel theologica ex idealismo 8μο corollaria v. g. adversus transubstan-tiationem intulisse manentibus enim speciebus nihil immutatum esse contendit". § 118 (immutatum is an error for mutatum. Acta Lips. i.e. Acta eruditorum quae Lipsiae publicantur). The fact that both this reference and that in § 115 are to "Acta eruditorum", and noy to "Clavis' 5 , would .seem to indicate that Collier's book was not known to Bilfinger. The view referred to is definitely stated by Collier. "So that if these (i. e. the sensible species of bodies) are supposed to remain as before, there is no possible room for the supposal of any change". The argument is that if a thing is nothing but the secondary qualities, then so long as the secondary qualities remain unchanged, no change can have taken place in the thing. Transubstantiation is therefore inpossible. "Clavis universalis" is the only book by which Collier deserves ! to be remembered. But he also published; in addition to two contros ) I retain the Spelling of the original. As evidence of the rarity of ".Clavis'* in Germany, I may quote a sentence or two from Eschenbach 1 s v preface. "If any book ever involved trouble in obtaining it, "Clavis universalis"· is that book. All my endeavours w.ere. in vain. At last a worthy friend, Herr J. Selck, sent me the worjk after I nad given up all hope that I should ever be able to procure it. n (p. 3.) In'an;appendix, Eschenbach argues that the Idealist proofs of the non-existence of matter apply also 'to soul. -.The Idealist arguments are therefore not valid. Again, the Idealist founds his conviction of the existence of soul or spirit'on imme^^te feeling.^.Bjiijb $n& argument, if valid at allj is TaHd also of tfye external -wrorld. , . .! r s versial sermons, "A specimen of true Philosophy" (1730) and "Logology" (1732). These treatises are as much theological as philosophical, and for our present purpose may be passed over in silence.
Collier's chief claim upon the interest of the student of philosophy lies in the similarity of his theory to that of Berkeley. That resemblance gives rise to certain problems, which have never really been faced, and ||icordingly it seems worth while to examine them. |p has always been assumed that CoH&r is quite independent of ey, and that Collier did not know of Berkeley's "Theory of ion" or "Principles" before the publication of his own book. But |is difficult to see any ground for this assumption. Collier mentions irkeley twice in lettersVwritten shortly after the publication of PClavis", and in neither case does he assert that his work is independent, or deny that he had seen Berkeley's "Principles" 4 ). In a letter written to Solomon Low, on March 8th, 1714, he says, "He (i. e. a certain Mr. Balch who hadcritised Collier) cannot show another in the world besides Mr Berkeley and myself, who hold the testimony of sense to be infallible as to this point" (i. e. the existence of visible objects). Writing to Samuel Clarke, an Feb. 14th, 1715, he says, "I could almost dare to put the whole question upon this trial, whether you, or any man else, ever so much as heard of either of them before (i. e. the theories that the visible world is not external, and that there is no such thing as external matter). I mean before Mr Berkeley's book on the same subject, which was published a small time before mine". It is certainly strange, if Collier had seen Berkeley's books that he does not refer to him in his Intro.duction. But on the-other hand, €ollier does not there claim that he is first in the field. At first sight, indeed, there are two sentences in the Introduction which seem to ; _ ". . . φ 4 ) But in a sentence in "A specimen of true Philosophy' 1 , he doesboth 'these things. He says of "Clavis n , "This work is, with the exception of a passage or two in the "Three dialogues" ,of Dr. Berkeley, printed in the same year, the only book on -the subject of whicb I have ever heard* 1 . These words, I think, both claim, independence for his work and assert that the "Three dialogues'* was the only one of Berkeley's books with which he was acquainted. But the latter statement may be disproved out of his own mouth; In the letter to Clarke, he speaks of "Mr Berkeley's book On the same subject which was : published a smaU time befqre mine'^ Now this must refer to· the "Principles'*, because the "Tljree dialogues'* was published afijer "Clayis'\ ... , claim originality for his work. He says that he has decided to publish his book, "rather than the world should finish its course r without once offering to enquire in what manner it exists" (p. 1). But this is simply a rhetorical flourish. Collier knew something of the history of philsophy, and he therefore knew that all philosophy is simply an enquiry into the manner of the existence of he world. Again, he speaks of the "ten years pause and deliberation", after which he had decided to bring his views before the notice of the public.. But he might still ha\ r e said this, even if he had seen Berkeley's "Principles", before the publication of his own work. The theory of the relationship which I should like to suggest is that Collier had for a considerable time been meditating and writing outline essays on the non-existence of the material world, and that when Berkeley's books appeared, he was both influenced on particular points and encouraged to formulate his own views more systematically. There is strong support for this theory both on external and on internal evidence. Before considering this evidence, it will be well to examine two arguments which have been advanced for the absolute independence of Collier.'
1. The most common view of the relation of Collier and Berkeley is that the concurrent publication of the two theories is a purecoincidence. Now a purely fortuitous coincidence is always possible,, and from the nature of the case, it admits of no explanation. And it is not prima facie strange that two men should independently deny the existence of he external world. It is indeed more strange that the -view should have cropped up so rarely. The view is a fairly natural one for a man who is just beginning to, think for himself to land in. It is perfectly possible that' both Berkeley and Collier hit upon the same view ... ... ....
2. But it is more probable that there is somo common source of their views. This is merely suggested by Eraser. "The agreement may be referred to the common philosophical point of view of the timp". "The intellectual atmosphere of the LocMan epoch in England contained elements favourable to such a result". Let us examine this suggestion. It is clear in the first place that their early philosophical environments were as different as possible. Berkeley was educated, in Dublin and Collier at Oxford. Berkeley's earlier interests were mainly mathematical, while Collier's were Classical.
And th& philosophers whe chiefly influenced them were, with one exception» , appeared pi^bable to BtigaldjStewajrt ("Wor^'V I, 161), and even to Hamilton (" , but is c^aMy fictitious. "
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Collier Scholasticism had some influence, and he never frees himself from Scholastic terminology} 0 ). On the other hand, Scholasticism had BO effect whatever on the formation of Berkeley's thought.
On the whole, then, the philosophical influences which played on Berkeley and Collier were very different. That they should both have hit upon the doctrine is not surprising. What is surprising is that it had not been promulgated long before. On purely philosophical grounds the doctrine is not reall y novel. It is adumbrated in the speculations of the Schoolmen. That the Schoolmen brought forth no system of Absolute Idealism was due to their physiology and their theology. In the Schools a subject frequently propounded for "deternun||ion" was, "Whether God may not maintain the species 11 ) before ad, the external reality being destroyed?" "Whether God may ring before-the senses the species representing an external world, l&ough the external world in reality does not exist?" On purely philosophical grounds, the weight of authority is in favour of an affirmative answer. But the physiological and theological presuppositions of the;time proved too strong (a). The Schoolmen, following Aristotle, held that the physiological conditions of sense-perception were such as to make* all sense-perception impossible apart from external material reality. As nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu, no knowledge at all is possible without an external/ world. But then came the physiological revolution, with which Descartes had so much to do, and the supposed necessity per perception of the external world was removed. Thus we find that Malebranche does not use this argument in favour of the existence of an external world, (b). Theologically also, The Schoolmen regarded Absolute Idealism as impossible. They were well acquainted with Idealist premisses, but on theological grounds they refrained from drawing Idealist; conclusions. It did not escape their notice that Absolute Idealism was incompatible with the doctrine of Transubstantiation.. So long as philosophy remained ancillary to a theology which maintained Transsubstantiation, Absolute Idealism was impossible. As have already mentioned, Collier pointed out that his theory disproved Transubstantiation. Berkeley .does not mention this as a consequence 10 ) cf. Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, vi, c § 8. u ) cf. Meditations chret/iennes, v., p. 64. , , ; . . ; . 12* of his doctrine, probably because he was acute enough to see that it applied also against the Incarnation, and he had 12 ) "determined to use the utmost caution not to give the least handle of offence to the Church or Churchmen".
We have now seen that it is perfectly possible that the concurrent formulation of Idealist theories by Berkeley and Collier was either a puie coincidence or the result of what Lyons calls "la force imp6rieuse d'une logique intorieure". But I think it is more probable that Berkeley exercised a direct influence on Collier. There is strong support for this view, both on external and on internal evidence.
(I). From external evidence it seems frankly inconceivable that Collier had not seen at least the "Principles" before the .publication of his book. "Clavis" was published in 1713, in the earlier part of the year. (Berkeley mentions it in a letter to Percival, dated June 1713.) About a year later Collier himself, as we have seen, mentions Berkeley, and it is fairly clear from the way he speaks, that his acquaintance with Berkeley's position was not very recently made. Berkeley's "Principles", published in London in 1710, created a good deal of stir. Sir John Percival did his best to make it widely known. The reports he sends Berkeley are not encouraging, but at least they show that people are talking about his book. In August 1710, Percival rites to Berkeley, ,,Α physician of my acquaintance argued you must needs be mad. A bishop pitied you. Another told me an ingenious man ought not to be discouraged from exerting his wit". In October 1710, he writes of Clarke and WBiston, "I can only report at secondhand that they think you a fair arguer and a clear writer; but they say your first principles you lay down are false". In December 1710, he writes that Lord Pembroke "thought the author an ingenious man and to be encouraged, "though he" cannot believe in the nonexistance of matter". It is clear, then, that Berkeley was being talked about, however unintelligently, in literary and philosophical circles in 1710. Is it likely that Collier did not hear of it? Langford Magna is not London. But Collier was not so isolated as one might think. The neighbouring parish is Bemerton, the rector of which, John Norris, "the English Malebranche", was still alive. And Salisbury, the Cathedral town, was at that time quite a literary centre. Further, 12 ) Works I 24, 155. tlhrough his wife, who was a daughter of Sir Stephen Fox, Paymaster o)f the Army, he had a connection with London. And lastly, Collier ! was a friend and correspondent of Whiston. Now Whiston had received firom Berkeley a copy of his "Principles", and was so much interested t;hat he went to see Clarke about the new doctrine 13 ). It seems exceedingly probable that (especially if he khew that Collier's thoughts were running in the same direction) he informed Collier of Berkeley's book 14 ). All this evidence amounts, it is true, to nothing more than .probability, feut the probability is so great as to be almost convincing.
(2). But it is certain that Collier had been incubating the theory, llong before he could have heard of Berkeley. In the first place we kave his explicit statement, already quoted, that he had entertained Ms doctrine ten years before publishing it. He must therefore have adopted it in 1703. Further, Benson had in his possession when he wrote the Memoir of Collier three of Colier's manuscripts, which contain drafts and sketches of the theory which was finally promulgated in t^lavis 1 '. The first of these is dated 1708, and is entitled "Sketch of Metaphysical Essay on the Subject of the Visible World beinĝ thout us or not".
On the whole, the external evidence seems to shoo that (I) Collier had seen Berkeley's "Principles" before the publication of his own book, but (2) he had hit upon the theory independently.
The internal evidence is, from the philosophical standpoint, more interesting. But here again we must be concerned with arguments which are merely probable. It must be admitted that there is nothing in "Clavis" which makes it certain that Collier had seen Berkeley's book. But on the whole, internal evidence seems to support our theory. If we compare "Clavis" with "Principles", the first notable difference is the absence of anything in i'Ciavis" corresponding to Berkeley's elaborate criticism of Abstract Ideas. With Locke Collier is not concerned at all. Collier's question is "Is there an external world?" While Berkeley denies mainly the materiality of the world, .Collier denies its externality. In the end the two arguments reach : Johnston, the same result, but the arguments/are different, and their tendency is different. Collier defines his terms very broadly. By "world" be; understands "body, extension, space, matter, quantity, etc." 35 ) and when he speaks of the world as "not external", he means that it exists u in or in dependence on mind, thought or perception". He gives three examples of what he means by saying that a thing exists in or in dependence on mind. It may exist in mind, (1) as an accident exists in substance (thus there is only one substance, i. e. mind: matter is only an accident. The Cartesian two-substance doctrine is by implication denied.); 2) as a body exists in a place (a most unfortunate example, for it suggests that the mind in which all things exist is spatial. But Collier certainly does not mean that); or (3) as an object of perception exists in its respective faculty. Collier prefers the third way of stating the relation. As objects seen in hallucinations or dreams are admitted to exist in or in dependence on mind, so Collier maintains in reality the whole world exists. These definitions and explanations are made in the Introduction. In Part I he endeavours to show that the visible world is not external. First, in Chapter I Section I he maintains that what is vissible need not be external, and then in Chapter,1 Section II that what is visible cannot be external.
(1), Collier's first thesis is that what is visible, is not -necessarily external, or that a thing may seem to be external without being really so. The first argument he adduces is fallacious. He holds that an object of imagination seems as much external as an object of perception. An object of imagination, e. g. a centaur, does not have external existence, therefore what seems t"o be external .need not be so. But it is psychologically false that an imagined object seems as much external as a perceived object. The imagined object is recognised as being dependent on the nuind in a way in which the perceived object is not. But Collier's next arguments are better. Secondary qualities are now admitted, thank to the proofs of "Mr Descartes, Mr Malet ranche and Mr Norris", in spite of their seeming externality, to be dependent on-mind. Therefore what is visible need not be external. (But it does not follow that because secondary qualities are subjective, i. e. depend on a percipient, they would exist if there were no external world. Both the percipient and the external world may be necessary ») Works I, , 41. foir their existence.) Collier next adduces a series of arguments to sluow that men in hallucinations, visions, dreams, see objects which seeem to be external. Thus what is visible need not be external. (This hasrdly follows either. Do men in hallucinations see objects which se<em to be external? TJiis is Collier's assumption. "What really haippens is the very different thing that they seem to see objects which are external. From this Collier could draw no eonclusioii to support his theory.) (2). Having, as he thinks, shown that what is visible need not be external, Collier now proceeds to prove that it cannot be external. In this he entirely fails. He rests his argument chiefly on an experiment which he requests each of his readers to make. Press or distort the eye., and look at the moon. Two moons will be seen. Thfese nxppns cannot both be external. TSierefore neither can be external Obviously Collier's fallacy lies in Merring that neither can be external. It is true that both 1 cannot be eiternal. Collier says that one can't be external and the other nöne^ernäl, because in th^t ease it ought to be possible to distinguish between the percepts, and that caji't be done. But note what the experiment involves. It implies interference\ with the normal conditions of sense-perception. -Collier's argument^: indeed, amounts to this. Because imder certain abnormal conditions€ . g, when you press your eye or labour under Hallucination, you see something which seems external though it really is not, therefore always.
under normal conditions what is seen to be external is not really so. From a proposition which istrue sometiin.es in abnormal conditions;. Collier attempts to deduce one which ij^true universally under normal conditions. Part II of "Clavis" extends the arguments of Part Ito the whole world. Part I was intendedto prove tha>t ühe visible world is not exteranl. Part H sets out to prove that there is no external woild a£ all. But the nine arguments which Collier brings forward, and the three objeetions to whijch he replises really make no further contribution to the question. These pages are cast in a Scholastic mould, bristle with technical terminology, and are both in matter and style ag different^-'as possible from Berkeley's work.
All in all, we have so far seen very little real similarity between Berkeley and Collier. ColBer's Introduction is written with the Cartesians in view. Berkeley's^^ is directed against Locke. And in the . 175 * joins with Berkeley against Malebranche, who maintained that all human as well as natural causation is due to God. (6). Collier points out (p. 9) that when he argues that all matter necessarily exists in some mind, he does not restrict this to created minds. Matter exists permanently in the mind of God. But Collier is not so fully aware as Berkeley of the necessity of God to guarante the permanence of the world. Thus we have half-a-dozen most important points in which Collier agrees with Berkeley mentioned in half-a-dozen pages, and no where else in the whole treatise. In the rest of "Clavis", as we have seen, the resemblance between Collier and Berkeley is very slight. Thus there seems to be a very strong /probability that in these half-a-dozen pages Collier is indebted to Berkeley. It has sometimes been suggested that mete luck was responsible for the difference in the fortunes enjoyed by Berkeley's and Collier's books respectvely. Nothing could be more false. On its intrinsic philosophical merits, Berkeley's work is in a different class altogether from Collier's. And while Berkeley's style is the most delightful in English philosophy, Collier's is gnarled and technical. Further, Berkeley plunged into most of the controversies of the day, while Collier's nearest approach to controversy was a mild indulgence ia the Arian heresy. Lastly, Berkeley" always tried his best to enlist people on his side. "Iside in sfll things with the mob." But Colliers book breathes the very spirit of odi profanum* and he takes as his motto this dictumof Malebranche, "Vulgi assensus et approbatio circa materiani difficilem est certum argumentum falsi<tatis istius opinionis eui assentitur.
